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Recently, there has been widespread focus
on studies of unconscious processing that
have come out of the field of “social
priming” (Doyen et al., 2012; Yong, 2012;
Shanks et al., 2013). This focus has primar-
ily been on their replicability (Pashler and
Wagenmakers, 2012) and attendant claims
of statistical and methodological impro-
priety (Simmons et al., 2011; Newell and
Shanks, 2014). The logic of the claims
made has received less attention. In this
commentary I draw attention to certain
limitations on the inferences which can be
drawn about participant’s awareness from
the experimental methods which are rou-
tine in social priming research. Specifically,
I ague that (1) a widely employed def-
inition of unconscious processing, pro-
moted by John Bargh is incoherent (2)
many experiments involve a perspectival
sleight of hand taking factors identified
from comparison of average group perfor-
mance and inappropriately ascribing them
to the reasoning of individual participants.
The claims made for the role of uncon-
scious processes are strong. For example,
one review states “priming studies have
consistently demonstrated that the mere
exposure to environmental events is suf-
ficient to directly trigger higher mental
processes, in the absence of any conscious
intentions or awareness that they oper-
ate” (Huang and Bargh, 2014, p. 9). The
power of unconscious influences is explic-
itly placed in opposition to conscious pro-
cessing “. . . by logical necessity [priming
effects have] reduced the presumed causal
role of intentional, conscious processes
in higher mental processes” (Bargh and
Huang, 2009, p. 128). This leads one
review to state “some volitional behav-
ior does not require any conscious aware-
ness at all” (Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010,
p. 469). Note that the claim is not that
unconscious processes are involved in
judgment, nor that priming can influence
higher mental processes. Rather it is far
stronger. Unconscious processes produce
judgment, priming triggers higher men-
tal processes, no conscious awareness is
required.
I do not wish to question the reality of
these priming effects, in that I believe that
most of these studies could be replicated.
Nor do I deny the challenge they pose
to our folk psychology of what influences
human behavior (which is often domi-
nated by a simplistic “all acts have deliber-
ate reasons” model). My purpose is merely
to draw attention to a disjuncture between
the methods used to assess unconscious
processes, and the claims made for them
in terms of their role in producing action.
PROBLEMS WITH DEFINING
UNCONSCIOUS BY FAILURE TO
REPORT
John Bargh has influentially defined
unconscious processes as those that “do
not influence subjective experience in a
way that [he or she] can directly detect,
understand, or report the occurrence or
nature of these events” (Bargh, 1992;
Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Huang and
Bargh, 2014, p. 14). This definition con-
tains a crucial ambiguity. How general
must the inability to detect, understand or
report be for a process to count as uncon-
scious? Some processes, which we might
most appropriately call nonconscious
are forever off limits to our introspec-
tion (they are “cognitively encapsulated,”
Fodor, 1983). Others may not be detected,
understood or reported on just one par-
ticular occasion. Does this make them
unconscious? It seems it does according to
the definition promoted by Bargh.
This new definition has been used to
support a shift from defining unconscious
as “without awareness of the stimuli” to
“without awareness of the influence of the
stimuli.” This creates two problems. The
first problem is it defines the “uncon-
scious” as much by the self-model of the
participants as by that of the experimenter.
For example, Custers and Aarts (2005) is
cited (e.g., by Huang and Bargh, 2014) as
an example of subliminal priming which
attests to the operation of unconscious
goals. The check which was used to ensure
that the stimuli really were subliminal was
to ask participants at the end of the experi-
ment if they were influenced by the stimuli
(Custers and Aarts, 2005, experiment 1).
In other words, unconscious operation
is defined by participants denying they
were influenced. Wilson (2002) has writ-
ten engagingly about the divergence of
our model of our thoughts and feelings
from our actual thoughts and feelings. You
don’t need to be social psychologist to see
that there could be many influences which
would lead to a participant denying the
influence of a stimulus on their choice,
and that these might be factors which—
while interesting—weaken the claim that
this definition of unconscious allows us to
focus on processes which are both a natu-
ral kind and truly unknown to the subjects
(they may, for example, be responding
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to perceived social pressure to deny the
influence of the factors in question).
A highly cited study (Bargh et al., 1996)
reported that participants were uncon-
sciously influenced by primes in a scram-
bled words task to walk more slowly down
a corridor upon leaving the experiment.
The authors reported, consistent with the
definition of unconsciousness that I wish
to question, that “no participant believes
that the word has an impact on his or her
behavior” (Bargh et al., 1996, experiment
1, p. 237). Remarkably, no further test of
the awareness of the primes was done on
the participants. Instead, a separate 19 par-
ticipants were tested and funnel debriefed
(with half in the experimental condition,
so we can expect 9 or 10 to have expe-
rienced the elderly primes). The basis for
claiming that priming was unconscious is
that these participants could not predict
what the influence of the primes would
be, nor connect them to the elderly stereo-
type. Aside from issues of statistical power
in this check, it seems that no participant
was ever directly asked if the primes would
affect the specific behavior which was mea-
sured. Even if we did ask them, we would
have no strong reason to believe that the
answers we got were because participants
were, in some strong sense, ignorant of the
influence of the primes on their behav-
ior. Instead, they may just give answers
which fit with common lay beliefs regard-
ing which factors should and shouldn’t
influence behavior.
This issue of how awareness should be
assessed, and of possible biases on sub-
jective reports, is a long-standing one1.
Reviews have highlighted the difficulty of
demonstrating with certainty that a partic-
ipant is unaware (Eriksen, 1960; Holender,
1986; Simons et al., 2007; Newell and
Shanks, 2014). The way you operationally
define consciousness is crucial to whether
you can demonstrate perception without
it (Reingold and Merikle, 1990; Merikle
et al., 2001). In contrast to Bargh et al.
(1996) other studies have used stricter
methods, such as forced choice questions
which remove biases to not report (since
they are forced choice) and allow any
feelings of awareness (however weak) to
inform the choice (see Hannula et al., 2005
1 I thank a reviewer for encouraging an exposition on
this point.
for a fuller discussion). It is against this
background that Bargh’s strategy of defin-
ing unconsciousness by failure to report
should be judged (Bargh, 1992; Bargh and
Morsella, 2008).
THE UNJUSTIFIED PERSPECTIVAL
SHIFT WHICH MAKES CLAIMS ABOUT
INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY BASED ON
GROUP DIFFERENCES
The second problem introduced by this
definition of unconscious concerns how
claims of the importance of factors in indi-
vidual cognition are made from experi-
ments which compare differences in group
averages. The logic of many of our behav-
ioral experiments encourages a perspec-
tival shift in which factors which have
the major influence on each individual’s
choices are rendered invisible, while an
experimental factor which has a minor
influence on each individual’s choice is
highlighted. This is obviously the intent—
the logic of a between subjects design is to
pull out the influence of the experimental
factor against a background of individual
variability. Using this method we identify
factors which we can show have a causal
influence at the level of group average. It
can be a mistake, however, to talk with
confidence about the nature of an individ-
ual’s choice, rather than the average effect
over individuals’ choices. Consider the
statement “Unconscious processes have
been shown to produce evaluation and
social judgment” (Huang and Bargh, 2014,
p. 9). This is simply wrong if we take
“produce” to mean “be solely responsible
for.” Unconscious processes do not pro-
duce, e.g., social judgments. The empirical
foundation for this claim is experiments
in which social judgment is produced by
individuals, who are quite conscious of
what they are doing at a macrolevel- i.e.,
willingly participating in an experiment.
Unconscious processes are shown to influ-
ence cognitions and behaviors, but they do
this as part of the conscious production of
these cognitions and behaviors.
If the unconscious nature of these pro-
cesses is validated at the individual level by
asking participants to report what influ-
enced their choices, but then the uncon-
scious process itself is attested to by a
difference in group means, it is possi-
ble that the experiment identifies a factor
which is a minor influence on the choice
as a whole. In other words the manipu-
lation can show a strong statistical effect
(and we’d hope that as professional exper-
imenters the researchers would design a
situation where this was exactly the case),
but for a factor which plays a marginal role
in each individual’s choice. Say the exper-
imental task is to evaluate a word as good
or bad. The word is rated as good or bad
and each individual, for each judgment,
may decide in a way that is consonant with
a deliberate and conscious decision mak-
ing process (i.e., one which is completely at
odds with the one being foregrounded by
proponents of automatic processing). The
dependent variable is reaction time, and
the effect of the prime is seen in average
differences in reaction time. The influ-
ence of the “unconscious” factor may be
to speed or slow them in their judgment,
while this judgment itself may take a value
informed by reasons which the participant
is fully aware of. Because “unconscious”
effects are manifest this way, it is mislead-
ing to talk of the unconscious as “produc-
ing” behavior when the only thing tested
are differences in characteristics of behav-
ior. This is both because the major element
of the behavior may not be affected by the
experimental manipulation (e.g., in this
case the judgment of the word as good
or bad, rather than the speed of the judg-
ment), and because it isn’t automatic that
an “unconscious” group difference implies
an “unconscious” individual judgment.
This perspectival sleight of hand
obscures the truly multicausal nature of
behavior behind the single controlled
cause that is privileged by the experi-
menter’s perspective. Participants in these
experiments are, as described, making
deliberate and reasoned choices. Their
failure to report the influence of the
experimental factor may result from an
impoverished or incorrect self-model, or
it may result merely from the relative
unimportance, at an individual level, of
the experimental factor in guiding their
choices. It is not possible, after all, to
report all influences on a behavior, even
for a fully informed and rational agent
(the “Frame problem,” Dennett, 1978).
For these reasons, it is not valid for the
conclusion to be drawn that unconscious
processes produce behavior, to the extent
that this excludes the role of conscious
processes in co-producing them. Nor is it
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valid to infer that unconscious processes
significantly determine overall behavior
of any individual at any time, as is often
implied.
Evidence of differences due to uncon-
scious processes at the group level do
nothing to confirm the importance of
the unconscious processes in affecting the
overall response of each individual. This
concern is particularly relevant for studies
of unconscious processing when the cri-
teria used to define what is unconscious
are based on asking individuals to make
judgments about the overall importance of
factors. To explore this, consider the ten-
sion between experimental effect sizes and
wider generalizability.
LARGER EFFECT SIZES CAN BE IN
TENSION WITH GENERALISABILITY
It is not the case that simple inspection
of effect sizes will necessarily reveal the
significance of an experimental factor in
reasoning. Since effect sizes are based on
the amount of variability in a measure, the
experimenter typically selects a measure
or situation in which variability in mini-
mized. Effect sizes are maximized by situa-
tions of tight experimental control—these
reduce the influence of non-experimental
factors, allowing a purer measure of the
experimental manipulation. Note that this
means that effect sizes can be unin-
formative about the importance of the
experimental factor in less tightly con-
trolled situations. Indeed, there is a sense
in which larger effect size (indicative of
tighter experimental control) may actually
anti-correlate with generalizability (which
requires effects which are robust across
situations). One response to failures to
replications social priming studies has
been that they require some expertise to
set up (e.g., Bargh, 2014)—this would
seem to be tacit admission of the fragile
generalizability of such effects.
CONCLUSION: WHICH INFLUENCES ON
BEHAVIOR IS IT REASONABLE TO
EXPECT A PERFECTLY CONSCIOUS
AGENT TO REPORT?
The Bargh definition assumes that a
rational agent with strong access to the
causal mechanisms supporting their deci-
sion process could report all factors affect-
ing their decisions. I wish to question this.
It would be bizarre if individual agents had
access to all the causal factors influencing
each of their choices. It would be equally
bizarre if they—unaware of the experi-
menters’ interest in a particularly minor
factor—were guaranteed to report it at the
exact time they were asked. By shifting
the defining criteria of unconscious fac-
tors to be those which are not reported
we open ourselves to the risk that pro-
cesses which are fully conscious, or poten-
tially conscious, are being used to make
claims about the unconscious. This may
not be a problem if the revisionist defi-
nition of unconscious is born in mind at
all times when the implications of these
experiments are discussed. Discussion of
whether or not this has been the case, both
within the scientific literature and in pop-
ular discourse, is beyond the scope of this
commentary.
The impoverished view of conscious-
ness that results from the Bargh defi-
nition is supported by methods which
are designed specifically to render con-
scious deliberation invisible. It remains
to be shown that human reasoning is
not dominated by self-aware deliberation
and based on principles of rationality,
which although limited and fallible, can be
considered and improved.
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